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ABSTRACT 
Underwood, Joshua C. M.A. School of Public and International Affairs, Wright State 
University, 2020. Game of Survival: External Actors’ Support for Separatists.  
 
 
 This research develops a novel model for external actors’ support for separatists.  
Three variables measuring external actors’ support are identified through two case 
studies, Kosovo Liberation Army and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, with an 
emphasis on Military Aid’s impact. The variables are then applied to a quantitative 
analysis of external actors’ support in a dataset of 75 observations during the years 1991-
2020, utilizing the Uppsala Conflict Data Program External Support Dataset. The 
findings for this research show that Military Aid and Moral Support improve the 
probability of survival for a separatist group. A deeper analysis reveals that military aid 
among the three major powers (People’s Republic of China, United States of America, 
Russian Federation) does not have a greater impact. Finally, the PRC’s Moral Support 
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I. Introduction  
 
The recent Russian involvement in Eastern Ukraine (2014) and Georgia (2008) 
conflicts has renewed debates on how external state actors help separatist groups survive. 
Specifically, recent studies have reopened the discussion and given new relevance to the 
methods by which separatist groups survive conflicts (Florea 2017, Saideman 2001, Tir 
2005, Toft 2010). For separatist groups, receiving aid from an external actor can have a 
significant impact on their chances of survival. There are a variety of forms of aid that an 
external actor may offer to a separatist group to give them the advantage in their fight for 
self-determination. External actors may give economic, military aid, or moral support to 
the separatist group. This begs the question; how does an external actor’s aid impact the 
chance of survival for a separatist group?  
Survivability for separatist groups depends on the necessary success that the group 
has against the central government. Contributions to the separatist conflict literature focus 
on how foreign states use aid to influence separatist wars; however, this does not directly 
explain how their support improves the secessionist likelihood of survival. Most 
contributions in the literature on separatist wars focus on similar types of aid but have not 
looked at these three particular types of aid, and their impact on separatist survival. 
Specifically, none of the literature argues that in order to improve the chances of survival 
for a separatist group, the external actor must provide military aid. 
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The research here will bridge this gap in the literature by presenting greater nuance 
to how external actors improve the probability of separatist survival. 
A new model is constructed to consider three types of external actor aid that 
increases the probability of survival for a separatist group. Specifically, the model will 
measure a set of novel variables that carefully consider how external actor aid can impact 
the probability of survival for a separatist group. After discussing the literature on external 
actor support for separatist groups, the separatist group’s probability of survival is analyzed 
through the successful case of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the failed case of 
the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE). These two case studies will establish the 
impact of military aid on a separatist group’s probability of survival. Lastly, a quantitative 
analysis of 75 separatist cases is constructed based on the variables identified for this 
research.  
Military aid, economic aid, and moral support are not novel variables; however, 
this research takes the unique approach of approaching each of these variables as if they 
are capable of increasing the probability of survival for a separatist group. Sequentially, 
seeing which type of aid improves the probability of survival for a separatist group may 
help shed light on how separatist groups persist and strive to gain international recognition 
to establish an independent state. By looking at each of these variables, the type of aid a 
separatist group will seek from an external actor can be determined. Furthermore, it is 
important to also consider why external actors will provide support to separatist group.  
External actors provide aid to a separatist group for three key reasons. First, 
naturally an external actor will support a separatist group with which they share 
transnational linkages and kinship, especially while simultaneously making an appeal to 
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their domestic audience. The external actor may see an opportunity to garner support from 
their domestic audience through an intervention in a neighboring state’s conflict if it is in 
support of a kinship group that is being oppressed or having their rights violated by the 
neighboring state.  
The second reason is more pragmatic: the external actor may benefit materially 
from improving a separatist group’s probability of survival. The argument could be made 
from a realist perspective that all states are self-interested, and when an external actor 
intervenes to support a separatist group, they are essentially helping the group on a quid 
pro quo basis. Some external actors may extend their influence in specific parts of the world 
specifically for the benefits they may gain from helping separatist groups in a particular 
region. In particular, the research here assumes that world powers like the United States of 
America (U.S.A), Russian Federation (RF), and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are 
the likely external actors to exert their influence beyond their home regions to gain allies 
in areas they view as strategic, receiving material benefits (sea ports, bases, etc.).  
The third reason external actors support foreign separatist groups is to gain security 
partners through which the external actor exerts greater influence abroad. The benefits of 
this action may not be readily apparent; an external actor may support a separatist 
movement because they view them as an ally which would yield more long-term 
investment. Establishing this partnership could greatly improve the separatist likelihood of 
survival. Security partnerships established through external actor support of separatist 
movements can be utilized to promote the values inherent to the culture/interests of the 
external actor. Subnational organizations like separatist groups will likely rely on the 
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external actor for support which may exacerbate tensions between them and their central 
government in future relations.  
 These fundamental insights provide greater depth to the existing literature by 
analyzing the impact of variables novel to the field of separatist conflict. This new research 




















II. Literature Review  
 
Civil Wars 
         Throughout history there have been numerous wars fought by subnational groups 
wanting to achieve independence. Some of these wars have been categorized as civil wars, 
while others are known as secessionist wars. Within the Civil Wars conflict literature, 
various causal factors are debated to explain what motivates these groups to take up arms 
against the central political authority. This leads to the question, what is the difference 
between civil wars and separatist wars? Civil wars, as defined by Fearon and Laitin (2003: 
76) “…[I]nvolve fighting between agents of (or claimants to) a state and organized, 
nonstate groups who sought either to take control of a government, to take power in a 
region, or to use violence to change government policies.” In other words, civil wars are 
fought between the central government and a group within the state with military force 
wanting to take control of the central government.  
 Pervious scholars have argued that civil wars are started because of grievances (Gurr, 
1970). Grievances are tied to discrimination and disadvantages between conflict parties as 
well as distinctive cultural differences (Gurr, 1993). Additionally, Collier and Hoeffler 
(2004) argue that civil wars are driven by greed or grievances. Specifically, they found that 
civil wars occur when states are too weak or poor to fight the rebels or when warlords try 
to loot natural resources to enrich themselves (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Furthermore, large 
groups that have been excluded and have less access to power are 
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more likely to start a conflict (Cederman, et al., 2010). Moreover, countries that are 
democratic and ethnically diverse are more/less likely to engage in civil wars (Elbadawi 
and Sambanis 2002).  In sum, civil wars are conflicts that are established by groups that 
are subsumed by greed, wishing to enrich themselves or take control of the central 
government. In the following section, separatist war is defined, and the interchangeable 
usage of the terms separatist and secessionist is explained.   
 
Separatist Wars 
There are a variety of distinctions between separatist wars; specifically, separatist 
conflicts occur when groups seeking independence attempt to establish their own state, 
while separatist autonomism occurs when groups seek self-governance without 
independence. Finally, separatist-merger conflicts are characterized by a separatist group 
aiming for reunification with another state (Heralcides 1997: 682). Moreover, separatist 
wars occur because subnational identity are not aligned with their state which is related to 
nationalist identity (Fearon, 2004). Separatists not only seek separation from the 
recognized state in which it resides, but seek independence while lacking international 
recognition (Florea, 2014). For the purpose of this research, we utilize the separatist war 
definition presented by Wood (1981). A secessionist war, as defined by Wood (1981: 110), 
is “…[A] demand for formal withdrawal from a central political authority by a member 
unit or units on the basis of a claim to independent sovereignty status.” Evidently, there is 
a clear distinction between the features of a separatist war and a civil war. Secessionist 
wars differ from civil wars because the secessionist group wants to formally withdraw from 
their sovereign state to establish their own independence. In sum, secessionist wars are not 
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civil wars because of the demand to withdrawal from the central state and establish an 
independent state. This research builds off this established distinction to explain how 
separatist groups exploit self-determination movements in their struggle against the central 
state, also known as the “parent” state.  
 
Self-Determination Movements 
The right to self-determination was the main focus for human right advocates 
following the dissolution of the Austria-Hungarian empire at the end of World War I. 
Self-Determination Movements (SDMs) gives these groups the legal right to seek 
autonomy (Ali 2014: 419). According to the “United Nations Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, Art. 1, 993 and 999 United Nations Treaty Series (U.N.T.S.) 
stipulates that:  
‘[A]ll people have the right to self-determination… The State Parties to 
the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the 
administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the 
realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in 
conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations” (Ali 2014: 
427). 
 
Under the United Nations (UN) Charter, any group has the legal right to separate 
from their parent state, and therefore, the parent state shall respect that group’s right.  
Any group that feels their rights are being violated or being oppressed by the central state 
has the right to initiate self-determination.  
On the other hand, some scholars have argued that international law does not 
grant any group the right to self-determinate from their parent state. Secessionist groups 
challenge the central (parent) state’s territorial integrity and their sovereignty (Sterio 
2014: 299).  Separatist groups have the right to self-determination; however, international 
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law argues that this leads to war and instability within the region. The wars fought over 
self-determination have led some external actors to support separatist groups. In order to 
contextualize these conflicts, an analysis of how external and internal actors impact civil 
wars is essential.  
 
External Actors and Internal Actors in Civil Wars 
  By definition, a civil war is a war between state and internal, subnational actors. 
The behavior of external actors in a civil war is largely driven by internal actors. 
Specifically, scholars have looked at the behavior of governments within these wars. 
Lacina (2006) argues that governments that are more democratic endure fewer conflict-
related deaths and that institutional constraints affect the outcome of civil wars. Sometimes 
a government’s institutional constraints can force them to compromise with opposition 
groups. Rodríguez-Franco (2016) argues that governments increase taxation of domestic 
elites to increase their forces’ chances of winning against their opponents. Governments 
will use this increased revenue to manufacture weapons and resources to support their 
troops. Stanton (2015) states that governments raise militias to attack the opposition’s 
civilian support base. Furthermore, Butt (2017) finds that a central government will use 
various methods to combat a secessionist movement depending on the level of support 
from a third party, ranging from their institutional constraints to using militia.  
However, the focus of civil wars literature has thus far been on how external actors 
have influenced this type of conflict. The broad literature on civil wars examines the 
duration of civil wars and how external actors’ influence lengthens them. Regan (2002: 
1996) examines how third-party intervention can affect the duration of civil wars. The 
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evidence the author finds is that intervention decreases the likelihood of wars ending within 
the next month. The author finds that external intervention is poorly managed and only 
prolongs the war rather than shortening them, while policymakers can choose when to 
intervene in order to end a war. Moreover, Aydin (2006) analyzes how diplomacy plays a 
critical role in external actors’ intervention. The author found that diplomatic interventions 
are a part of conflict management and can change the trajectory of civil wars. 
Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2000) examine how third-party states impact civil 
wars. Their findings show that interventions occur because of third-party strategic 
decisions to do so and that there is a greater chance for civil wars to stall and potentially 
prolong during this period. The prolonging of wars correlates with Regan’s (2002) 
findings. The authors suggest that further research is critical to the field in trying to 
understand third-party behavior and interests. The broad literature of civil wars has 
discovered that external actors’ influence only prolongs the conflict. These conclusions 
reinforce how crucial external actors can be in civil wars. However, they fail to explain the 
reasons for external actors’ involvement.       
  
External Actors Involvement 
Previous research has attempted to explain external actors’ behavior and reasons 
for involvement in civil wars. Kathman (2010), Regan (1998), Mitchell (1970), 
Cunningham (2010) and Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2011) examine the 
conditions and behavior of third-party groups’ involvement. Kathman (2010) focuses 
research on geopolitical wars that pose various types of threats to neighboring countries 
that other third-party interveners may never face. The author finds that enthusiasm to 
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intervene varies across third-party states because their threat reduction is different from 
other third-party interveners. Regan (1998) finds that external actors intervene on 
conditions that may involve humanitarian crises, while Mitchell (1970) finds that 
intervention occurs when ethnic groups in civil wars seek to gain resources from external 
actors. Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2010) find that external actors that have an 
independent agenda extend wars significantly longer. While Cunningham (2011) contends 
that external actors are less likely to support strong rebel groups, Mitchell (1970) argues 
that transnational linkages and interstate rivalries are crucial for rebels gaining support 
from external actors. Khosla (1999) examines third world countries who have intervened 
in ethnic conflicts and expands research on the interventions. The author finds that half of 
the interventions were initiated by states within the same region. Also, regional powers are 
more likely to provide resources to ethnonationality or militant sects because of their 
positions against the government, especially the ethnonationalist groups who were seeking 
autonomy from their state. 
These authors show that resources influence how external actors behave and 
explain why they have taken interest in certain conflicts. The behavior and interests of 
external actors are crucial for the field because it offers insights broadening our 
understanding of the motivations of those actors. However, they fail to explain separatist 
groups’ requirements for survival. The next section will discuss what separatist groups 





Necessities for Survival  
Though separatist groups may not have the same access to resources as the central 
government, some groups find various ways to survive. Previous research has analyzed 
how some separatist groups have managed to survive throughout the war and beyond. Most 
contributions to the literature designate these groups as “de facto states” because they have 
their own autonomy but have not established independence as a state. Some of the de facto 
states have managed to survive and finding the key necessities in what helps separatists 
succeed is critical in understanding their survival. The literature on de facto states 
establishes criteria for why these states have succeeded. As stated by King (2001: 525),  
“First, the territorial separatists of the early 1990s have become the state 
builders of the early 2000s, creating de facto countries whose ability to field 
armed forces, control their own territory, educate their children, and 
maintain local economies is about as well developed as that of recognized 
states of which they are still notionally a part.” 
 
The survival of separatist regions lies in establishing their armed forces, allowing them 
to maintain control over territories. They are also able to structure and maintain their 
economy which has given them the opportunity to better educate their youth. State 
recognition has been difficult for most de facto states to gain; however, it is not completely 
out of reach. Berg and Toomla (2009) found that some de facto states have received some 
type of recognition (negative, boycott, toleration, and quasi-recognition) allowing them to 
gain status on the international stage.  
Kolstø (2006) finds that some separatist groups use what resources they have in 
building their defensive forces. Availability of natural resources to the separatist group 
plays a critical role in developing these forces. The funds provided by external actors allow 
them to successfully capture and sell resources, giving them the capital to invest in arms 
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and soldiers (Ross 2004). Heraclides (1997: 684) conducted a study of 77 cases between 
1945-1996 and found that the state achieved military victory 21 percent of the time, while 
separatists only achieved victory in 10 percent of cases. Winning 10 percent of conflicts 
shows the importance of military resources for any group fighting the central state because 
of the rarity of successful separatist outcomes. The degree of militarization is critical for 
any separatist group because military resources are crucial for the survival for any 
separatist group. However, separatist groups that receive military assistance from foreign 
actors restrict the opportunity for a peaceful reintegration and national recognition (Florea 
2017: 337-38). While separatist groups are less likely to reintegrate after engaging in 
conflict, what is essential for this research is the group’s likelihood of survival, for which 
reintegration is not necessary.  
There is, however, value in understanding how these de facto states fail. Heraclides 
(1997: 689) contends that separatist regions fail because they have lost foreign military 
support and can no longer maintain their fight against a central state. The author argues 
that separatist groups do not have the resources needed to ensure they can maintain their 
territory. This conclusion indicates that separatist groups survive by maintaining armed 
forces, selling their natural resources, and receiving some type of political recognition. It 
also shows how critical military support is to a separatist group maintaining their de facto 
state status. However, these conclusions fail to explain why external actors are motivated 






Separatists and External Actors Relations 
The affiliation between separatists and external actors is critical to understand 
why external actors establish relations. The sub-literature on this topic analyzes 
secessionist and external actors’ relationship in separatist wars specifically. According to 
Bélanger, Duchesne, and Paquin (2005) democratic states rarely help separatist 
movements in other democratic states, but this pattern does not correspond to autocratic 
states. Temporal limitations restrict the study, yet it does provide insight into how states 
decide what separatist groups they establish relations with. Heraclides (1990) examines 
the relationship between external actors and separatists. The author’s findings show that 
support via arms and funds are motivated by tangible gain, yet some states became 
involved for intangible reasons. Yet, Heraclides fails to discuss what type of arms and 
funds external actors provided to separatist groups. Saideman (2002) and Cartmen and 
James (1997) examined how groups receive support, finding that ethnic politics was the 
major influence for states deciding to support certain groups; however, Saideman fails to 
discuss what type of support separatists receive from external actors. These findings 
depict how foreign states use instruments to influence separatist wars but do not directly 
provide answers as to how the aid impacts the secessionist probability of survival in the 
war. The precise causal mechanism to explain how external aid helps secessionist groups 
survive is thus an area that is critical but under-researched.  Therefore, we can now look 
at the effectiveness of external actors’ types of aid and recognition and how that impacts 




External Actor’s Effectiveness and Outcomes  
An external actor’s effectiveness in determining the outcome of a separatist war 
depends on the type of support they have provided. Separatist groups are demonstrably 
able to maintain their territory by having an armed force and managing their local 
economies. Yet, sometimes separatist groups acquire additional support to ensure that they 
can maintain control of their territory and resources. Varying types of aid may be provided 
to support them. Florea (2017) lists four types of variables that affects de facto state 
survivability: military support from outside actors, state building, fragmentation within 
separatist groups, and veto players.  
 Florea (2017: 349) finds “Military support from an external actor resulted in 
reducing separatist incentives to negotiate.” Military aid from external actors “…[I]njects 
vital lifeblood into the arteries of a de facto state by providing rebels with the resources 
needed to prevent forceful reintegration (Florea 2017: 340).” Receiving military aid 
strengthens the separatists’ chances of surviving and provides them the opportunity to 
maintain their fight against the central government. Military aid improves the outcome for 
separatist groups because it allows them to avoid being forced into an agreement that falls 
short of their expectations.  
Also, certain world powers, like the U.S., offer diplomatic support to ease tensions 
for separatist regions that have been economically isolated from the rest of the world (Pegg 
and Berg 2016). The separatist groups that are supported by the U.S. are treated poorly, 
potentially damaging their chances of survival (Pegg and Berg 2016: 284). External actors 
have given funds to separatists so that they may buy arms and train soldiers to accomplish 
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their missions (Ross 2004). The financial support from foreign governments increases 
separatists’ incentives to continue fighting, impacting their chances of survival (Ross 
2004).  Furthermore, Coggins (2011) finds that when one or more great powers recognized 
a separatist group, it increases the likelihood that others recognize it. The author argues 
that external politics plays a critical role in state recognition and thus in separatist 
movements having a successful outcome.  
Furthermore, external actor support ensures their survival by providing them with 
the necessary military aid and moral support. Additionally, timing is crucial to the survival 
of a separatist group; the earlier that an external actor begins supporting the group the more 
likely that they survive (Byman, et. al. 2001: 10). Receiving military aid is critical for a 
successful outcome for a separatist group, and adding moral support only solidifies the 
probability of survival for the group. Timing is also critical for a separatist group, and the 
earlier the external actor provides support, the greater chance for a successful outcome.  
Although any kind of external dependence hurts the separatist group’s status on the 
international stage and their strategy in gaining independence (Caspersen 2009), Ozpek 
(2014) discusses from a realist approach how external actors’ national interest weighs 
heavily if a regime recognizes a separatist group. Hence, the possibility arises for a 
separatist group to appeal for moral support from external actors because of mutual 
interests or national kinship. This research provides insight into how the effectiveness of 
foreign state assistance impacts the survivability of separatist groups but does not directly 
provide answers as to which type of support most impacts survivability. Therefore, my 
research bridges this gap in the literature by building a nuanced argument for which type 
of aid improves the likelihood of separatist survival. To highlight the impact of access to 
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foreign military aid to the success of a separatist region, the following sections will reveal 























III. Successful Separatist Case Study: Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) 
 
The Kosovo War is recognized by many scholars as an example of a successful 
separatist case. The case illustrates the importance of external support for separatist 
survivability, specifically the impact of military aid. The discrete impact of these 
concepts can be operationalized through a quantitative analysis to determine the 
relevance of external support’s impact on separatists’ survival. The Kosovo case is a 
prime example of how an external actor can provide military aid, economic aid, and 
moral support to improve the separatist group’s chances for survival. Furthermore, it 
exemplifies how military aid has the largest impact on ensuring separatist survivability 
during the war and beyond.  
 
Historical Background  
In 1998-1999, the Kosovo War was described as a humanitarian war by the West 
because of the ethnic cleansing committed by Serbian soldiers operating within the 
Yugoslavian forces. The actions of the Serbian forces and the Kosovar Albanians resulted 
in clashes and disputes over territorial control. The violence against innocent civilians led 
to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention in 1999 and paved the way 
for international recognition for the state of Kosovo. The events precipitating this conflict 
provide greater context for the separatist war that took place.  
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Kosovo is located in the southernmost province of modern-day Serbia and was one 
of two autonomous provinces in Yugoslavia (Dempsey 1998: 95; Smith 2001: 2). In 1912, 
during the Balkan War, the Serbs were successful in acquiring the Kosovo region (Smith 
2001: 2). During World War II (WWII), Axis powers were able to acquire control of 
Kosovo in 1941, the control of which they proceeded to hand over to Albania (Dempsey 
1998: 96). In 1946, after the end of WWII, Kosovo was returned to Yugoslavia and given 
autonomous status (Dempsey 1998: 97). In 1963, Kosovo was upgraded to an autonomous 
province and eventually in 1981 gained full republic status by utilizing force; however, the 
ruling was met with opposition from the Communist Party of Serbia (Dempsey 1998: 97).  
In 1989 and 1991, Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević removed Kosovo’s autonomous 
status, which lead to Kosovo forming their own government and seeking independence 
(Dempsey 1998: 97). The people of Kosovo had experienced the opportunities of autonomy 
only to have the government authorities remove their status. The Serbian government was 
not without justification, however, as terrorist activities perpetrated by Kosovan separatists 
led to the decision to remove their autonomy.  
In December 1993, in response to the Serbian government’s oppressive tactics, the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was created (Mulaj 2008: 1108). KLA’s goal was to 
achieve independence from Yugoslavia and even claimed responsibility for bombings that 
occurred in the southern part of the country (Dempsey 1998: 94). The KLA had acquired 
funds through a variety of illegal activities, including selling drugs, prostitution, and 
extortion networks (Özerdem 2003: 80). Furthermore, in the early 1990s, the KLA devoted 
the majority of their attacks to sporadic assassinations against Serbian police, before 
moving to hit and run attacks in the mid-1990s (Mulaj 2008: 1112). In late 1996, the KLA 
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conducted 15 attacks against the Serbian police in which 15 were killed and 2 injured 
(Mulaj 2008: 1112). These terrorist attacks by the KLA led the Serbian government to 
create plans to counter these incidents.  
In February 1999, Serbian leader Milošević introduced “Operation Horseshoe” to 
combat the KLA (BytyÐci 2015: 133). The goal of Operation Horseshoe was to “eliminate 
KLA and initiate cleansing of Kosovo of Albanians” (BytyÐci 2015: 133). The 
international community felt that Kosovo was an internal state issue for Serbia, and decided 
to not intervene (Mulaj 2008: 1109). The atrocities committed by Serbian forces against 
Albanians in Kosovo led to consternation from leaders around the world, particularly the 
UN. On March 31st, 1998, the UN Security Council initiated a resolution condemning both 
sides for their acts of violence and demanding that both cease their activities (BytyÐci 
2015: 133). Eventually, after the continued hostile acts committed by the Serbian troops 
against the Kosovo Albanians and the failure to reach an agreement with Milošević, the 
international community decided to take action.  
Kosovo Albanians were offered various opportunities for autonomy, only to have 
their central government strip that right away from them. The Serbian government proceed 
to commit atrocities against the Kosovo Albanians; however, the international community 
decided to take action to become involved by utilizing NATO’s diplomatic and military 






External Actor’s Involvement  
The international community was dismayed by the atrocities that were committed 
by the Serbian forces in Kosovo. NATO initiated negotiations with Milošević but failed to 
reach a resolution. The intention of NATO’s initial involvement was to create a solution to 
a political crisis that had turned into a diplomatic failure (BytyÐci 2015: 136). NATO 
created a plan, “NATO OPLAN,” which consisted of 3 phases. Phase 1 was to establish air 
superiority, Phase 2 was to attack military targets south of the 44 degrees north latitude, 
and Phase 3 was to expand air operations throughout the region (Arkin 2001: 4). 
Eventually, NATO OPLAN was later renamed Operation Allied Force (OAF) with the 
intended goal to drive Serbian troops out of Kosovo (Smith 2001: 1). NATO defended their 
plan of intervention by utilizing Chapter VII Article 2, Paragraph 4, which allows the use 
military force for humanitarian means in a regional conflict (BytyÐci 2015: 134). The 
atrocities that the Serbian troops had already committed in Kosovo left NATO with no 
other option but to use military force as a means to prevent a disaster from occurring.  
On March 23, 1999, NATO’s Secretary General Javier Solana authorized the use 
of force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and Serbian forces (BytyÐci 
2015: 139). NATO commenced OAF at 19:45 Central European Time (CET) on March 24 
by conducting air operations. NATO’s involvement was to find a solution for the Kosovo 
Albanians who had their autonomy stripped away on countless occasions and were being 
repressed by their central state. The only option NATO had to find a solution for the 




NATO’s Military Aid 
 NATO’s military resources proved to have a critical impact on the KLA in the 
Kosovo War. NATO targeted key facilities, such as: “airfields, army bases, munitions 
storage facilities, engineer depots, arms and heavy equipment factories, petroleum storage 
facilities, smelters, and an aviation repair base (Haulman 2015: 17).” In particular, NATO’s 
air forces hit 40 military facilities, with 400 flights hitting the anti-aircraft defense network 
and 300-350 aircraft hitting refineries, fuel depots, and military barracks (BytyÐci 2015: 
143). NATO had success in targeting the Serbian military because of the mutual sharing of 
information with the KLA (Mulaj 2008: 1113). The KLA was able to provide key Serbian 
military positions to NATO’s bombers, which gave the KLA an advantage against the 
Serbian forces. NATO’s targeting capability and the KLA’s strategic guidance proved a 
winning combination, allowing the combined forces, though overstretched, to cover over 
40% of Kosovan territory (Koktsidi and Dam 2008: 170).  
NATO was also successful through more diplomatic measures. As Haulman (2015: 
16) states, “A combination of military and diplomatic pressure ultimately succeeded in 
convincing Milosevic to accept a peace deal.” Therefore, the KLA greatly benefited from 
NATO’s strategic bombing which allowed them control of over 40% of the territory. 
NATO’s military aid helped pressure Serbian leader Milosevic to accept a peace deal but 
it was a combination of NATO’s targeting and KLA’s territorial control made the NATO 
intervention so impactful, ultimately forcing Milosevic to accept the peace terms. It should 
be noted that diplomatic pressure played a critical role, and we will discuss how NATO 
countries utilized their diplomatic networks later in this section.  
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NATO’s Economic Aid 
 The successful conclusion to the Kosovo War saw the NATO powers establish U.N. 
Security Resolution 1244, which consisted of the United Nations Interim Administration 
in Kosovo (UNMIK), tasked with state-building and transferring administrative duties to 
Kosovan officials and institutions (Woehrel and Kim 2008: 5). Furthermore, NATO, the 
UN, and the European Union (EU) provided substantial monetary support to help the KLA 
and Kosovo rebuild the region and allow Kosovo to pursue state recognition. Since 1999, 
UNMIK and EU has provided Kosovo with a total of close to $40 Billion for infrastructure 
development and state-building (Džihić and Kramer 2009; Elbasani 2018). The goal was 
to catalyze economic development and advise on rule of law institutions (Džihić and 
Kramer 2009: 14). Additionally, the EU utilized 14,500 Kosovo Force (KFOR) troops for 
security measures to ensure stability (Džihić and Kramer 2009: 2). KFOR’s other goal was 
to enforce the provisions of the Military Technical Agreement (MTA) and the 
demilitarization of the KLA (Woehrel and Kim 2008: 12). The monetary support and 
security forces provided by NATO and other organizations has provided an opportunity for 
Kosovo to establish nationwide stability and pursue state recognition. Therefore, the 
economic aid that was provided to the KLA helped provide Kosovo a path to statehood as 
long as they followed the guidelines set by UNMIK and the EU. It is unlikely that any 
substantial economic development could have been achieved without the presence of 
NATO’s military forces. The establishment of KFOR has also allowed officials to focus 




NATO’s Moral Support  
KLA’s goal was to establish their autonomy and successfully secede from Serbia. 
However, this was initially unlikely because of world powers opposing their 
independence (Woehrel and Kim 2008: 12). In 1998, the U.S. designated the KLA a 
terrorist organization (Özerdem 2003: 80). This condemnation of the KLA, which would 
restrict much of the NATO support required to establish statehood, stood as an early 
barrier to Kosovan statehood. Despite this, the international community established the 
Ahtisarri Proposal for Independence, which the U.S., NATO, and EU supported, while 
Russia needed more time to make a decision (Woehrel and Kim 2003: 17). The result of 
the proposal was inconclusive, yet eventually granted Kosovo the right to seek 
membership in international organizations and recommended eventual independence 
(Woehrel and Kim 2003: 17). The proposal’s controversiality meant it was not agreed 
upon unanimously in the international community, which lead to the Troika Talks. The 
Troika Talks were similar to the Ahtisarri proposal in its attempt to establish the future of 
Kosovo; however, the talks could not reach a mutual agreement (Woehrel and Kim 2003: 
18).  
Ten years after the start of the Kosovo War, Kosovo declared its independence in 
February 2008 (Cottey 2009: 594). Kosovo was officially recognized as a “Contact 
Group” which consisted of some of the main powers of the international community. As 
stated by Mulaj (2008), “KLA’s historic recognition occurred at Rambouillet and Paris 
international conferences (February and March 1999) by France, Germany, Russia, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States (1109).”  The U.S. and United Kingdom (U.K.) 
organized their diplomatic networks to help Kosovo achieve their independence status. 
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Specifically, they encouraged other countries to recognized Kosovo’s statehood by 
consistently using the UN Security Council meetings to pressure other states (Newman 
and Visoka 2018: 380).  
Since the recognition from the G7 countries and its established independence, 
Kosovo’s state recognition has gained traction. According to BytyÐci (2015: 176), 
“Kosovo’s independence has been recognized by the United States of America, France, 
UK, Germany, and Turkey. As of July 2013, 110 countries, among which are 22 EU 
states, and all G7 countries have recognized Kosovo’s independence.” Kosovo has seen a 
resounding amount of support from the international community following their 
secession from Serbia.  
In sum, Kosovan independence could not have been achieved had the U.S. and 
U.K. not utilized their diplomatic network and status to pressure states to recognize 
Kosovo. Moreover, the military aid from NATO further legitimized Kosovo’s quest for 
independence. NATO’s resources and diplomacy were therefore crucial in helping the 
KLA achieve independence. Its willingness to intercede on behalf of the KLA and devote 
valuable resources to the cause had an irrefutable impact on the success of the secession, 








External Actor Effectiveness and Outcome 
NATO’s use of their resources was effective in shifting the war in KLA’s favor 
because hitherto, KLA’s troops were not successful in pushing Serbian troops out of the 
region. Utilizing air power had already been established as an effective option for 
countries that intervene in conflicts (Pashakhanlou 2018: 39). Air raids allow the 
intervening country to make an impact on the conflict without sacrificing thousands of 
ground troops. NATO launched air raids against FRY without support from China and 
Russia (Pashakhanlou 2018: 42-43). NATO claimed that the Kosovo Albanian population 
were being targeted by FRY forces, particularly Serbian police and paramilitary forces, 
which led them to decide that the only option to stop these acts was through military 
force (Pashakhanlou 2018: 42). Furthermore, the KLA was provided military aid by the 
U.S., Germany, and Switzerland (Mulaj 2008: 1111). In addition to providing military aid 
to the KLA, NATO also used air support to give them an advantage over Serbian forces.  
The KLA was aided by NATO’s air raids on Serbian infrastructure, which were 
crucial to their war effort. According to Pashakhanlou (2018: 43), “NATO utilized 38,000 
aircraft sorties who conducted 10,500 strike missions and 12,000 tons of munitions, making 
it the alliance’s largest air operation to date.” Eventually, in the final days of the war, the 
air power used by NATO had significant success in hitting Serbian military targets (Gallis 
1999: 7). The number of weapons and ammunition that were provided and used by NATO 
against the Serbian forces helped place pressure on Milošević to come to an agreement. 
NATO’s military aid forced Serbian leader Milošević to come an agreement with 
NATO and KLA, known as the Kumanovo Agreement. The agreement was signed on June 
9th and began the process of ending the conflict and withdrawal of Serbian forces (BytyÐci 
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2015: 153-178). NATO’s military aid played a critical role in the outcome of the war. Their 
aid was effective in helping secure KLA’s victory by applying pressure on the Serbian 
opposition, which forced the Serbian leader into agreeing to end the conflict. Moreover, 
this allowed Kosovo to finally receive the state recognition that they had been seeking since 
they declared self-determination. Next, it is imperative to look at how the NATO 
intervention with military aid increased the likelihood of survival for Kosovo because of 
the success they had in the international community and how they have managed to 
maintain their independence. 
 
Probability of Survival  
 NATO’s involvement dramatically improved Kosovo’s probability of survival 
because of their military resources. NATO’s continued presence in Kosovo allowed the 
KLA to maintain control of their territory which ensured their independence. According to 
BytyÐci (2015: 179-88), “Kosovo was turned into a protectorate that was divided into five 
sectors with 6,000 German and Turkish forces in the South, Italian forces in the West, 
6,100 French forces in the North, 7,400 U.S. forces in the East, and 6, 200 Great Britain 
forces in the Center.”1 NATO had established ground troops, also known as Peacekeepers, 










Who controls Kosovo? The Economist. June 24th 1999. 
 
 In summary, NATO’s aid had a tremendous impact on Kosovo’s probability of 
survival. The pressure from the aerial bombing and the economic investment by NATO 
and its allies improved Kosovo’s chances of survival. Moreover, the presence of troops has 
solidified Kosovo’s independence and has ensured their probability of survival within the 
international community. The presence of NATO has provided legitimacy for Kosovo 
because without the military resources, the chance of Kosovo surviving is reduced. In sum, 
military aid is crucial for the separatist group’s probability of survival and that is why it is 




 NATO’s military aid played a critical role in improving Kosovo’s probability of 
survival against the FRY and Serbian central state authority. The KLA would not have 
been as successful in their bid for self-determination without NATO ‘s military aid, 
economic aid, and moral support. NATO’s air support and cooperation with the KLA was 
strategic in helping the group maintain control of 40% of their territory. Furthermore, it 
helped them apply pressure on the central state to come to an agreement to grant them 
autonomy. Moreover, NATO’s economic aid was vital for the KLA to help them begin to 
develop their institutions, while their diplomatic pressure convinced states to recognize 
them. Ultimately, none of the above would have been possible had NATO not provided 
military aid to the KLA during the war nor provided stability after the war so that they 
could build institutions and gain recognition.  
NATO intervened in the Kosovo conflict because the KLA provided pragmatic and 
strategic benefits to the western organization. NATO was able to establish bases to 
challenge potential Russian aggression and exert greater influence in Eastern Europe. 
Furthermore, by supporting the KLA, NATO was able to create an alliance with a 
subnational group in the region allowing for further westernization of the fledgling state. 
Establishing a security partnership provides long-term benefits for both NATO and KLA 
because it allows NATO to counter other states that may try to influence the region and 
increases Kosovo’s state legitimacy. Therefore, there are tangible benefits that attracted the 
external actor (NATO), which motivated its aid to the separatist group (KLA) to improve 
its likelihood of survival.  
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IV. Failed Separatist Case Study: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
 
The Kosovo War provides an excellent example of a successful separatist case 
because of the impact that NATO had on the outcome of the conflict.  However, there are 
cases in which external actor support is unsuccessful. The Sri Lankan Civil War provides 
a unique case because of the external support the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) received from India between 1983 and 1987. The Sri Lankan Civil War is 
technically a separatist war because the LTTE is seeking to establish their autonomy. The 
withdrawal of this support post-1990 provides a unique opportunity to analyze the impact 
of external support on the same separatist organization. After analyzing the impact of 
external support (or the lack thereof) on the LTTE over three decades, the LTTE is 
compared to the KLA to quantify how external actor support impacts the survival of a 
separatist group.  
 
Historical Background  
Tamil nationalism increased with the creation of the Sri Lankan state in 1931 
(Hariharan 2008: 37). During the 1940s and 1950s, Tamil nationalists demanded to 
receive state representation and eventually requested to become a federal state. The goal 
was to counter the Sinhala policies that discriminated against the Tamil community 
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(Hariharan 2008: 37). Specifically, the Ceylon Citizenship Act of 1948 and the Sinhala 
Only Bill discriminated against the Tamil community by declaring them noncitizens and 
making Sinhala the official language (McConnell 2008: 62-3). The systematic 
discrimination by the Sri Lankan government caused the Tamil leaders to take action and 
defend their homeland.  
The Tamil separatist movement was created out of frustration toward the ethnocentric 
policies put in place by the Sri Lankan government (DeVotta 2009: 1021). Tamil 
leadership announced the right to self-determination for their homeland in 1976 
(McConnell 2008: 65). The declaration for the right to self-determination was followed 
by the creation of armed groups taking up the cause. According to Hussain (2008: 81), 
“The Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam was founded by Vellupillai Prabhakaran on 
March 5, 1976, the day he conducted a successful bank robbery in Puttur.” The LTTE 
committed more than common crime; they were known perpetrators of many terrorist 
attacks. Similar to the KLA, the LTTE purchased their arms through the black market 
with ill-gotten funds from bank robberies, drug trafficking, and welfare fraud (Abel 1995; 
Herinrich 1986). According to Samaranayake (2007: 178), LTTE attacks between 1984 
and 2004 killed 3,045 civilians while injuring 3,704. These attacks frequently utilized 
terror tactics as the LTTE resorted to using car bombs and assassinations of political 
leaders (Ministry of Defense, Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka 2011; Kaufman 
1996).   
The goal for the separatists was to establish their own independent state, which 
consisted of the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka (Pfaffenberger 1995: 130). 
According to McConnell (2008: 72), the “Tamils’ homeland has been occupied by the 
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military of successive Sri Lankan governments. LTTE was engaged in an armed struggle 
based on the right to self-determination because of the acts of genocide committed by the 
Sri Lankan government.”  In 1977, the Sri Lankan elections saw the Tamil United 
Liberation Front (TULF) vote on a mandate for a separate Tamil state, precipitating the 
conflict (Sarvananthan 2018: 2).  The roots of the conflict were LTTE territory claims 
and Sinhalese Buddhist politicians ensuring the dominance of the Sinhalese Buddhist 
population throughout Sri Lanka (Devotta 2009: 1022).  The violence between the Sri 
Lankan government and the LTTE lead to the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA). 
According to DeVotta (2009: 1028), the PTA “allowed security forces to arrest and hold 
anyone suspected of subversive activities incommunicado and without trial for up to 18 
months. Many Tamils were caught and tortured under the PTA.” The repressive tactics 
used against the Tamil community violated their right to self-determination, which forced 
them to take up arms.   
The Tamil conflict has seen at least four different phases to the war with the last 
occurring from 2006-2009. The Tamil community wanted to establish their own state by 
declaring self-determination. However, the repressive policies that were carried out by 
the Sri Lankan government prevented the Tamil community from achieving that dream. 
Those policies forced the Tamil community to create groups that would fight for their 
cause; yet, even though the LTTE were able to put up a fierce fight against the Sri 
Lankan government, they failed to achieve their goal of an independent state.  
The lack of external actor support hurt the LTTE’s chances of winning their 
independence. Ultimately, the Sri Lankan government forces were able to capture the lost 
territory that the Tamil separatists had acquired throughout the war. Unlike the KLA in 
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Kosovo, who received military aid from an external supporter, the lack of an external 
actor sealed the LTTE’s fate as they could not withstand the counter offensive by the 
central state; they simply did not have access to the requisite supplier of military aid. 
LTTE’s early successes, which occurred concurrently to support from an external actor, 
were brutally reversed throughout the 1990s and 2000s.  
 
India’s Support (1983-87) 
 The LTTE did not have the continuous external support that the KLA received in 
Kosovo; however, the LTTE did receive support from India until 1987. Between 1983-
1987, India provided military aid on their soil, where they trained LTTE soldiers 
(Hariharan 2008: 38). India was the only external actor to provide any kind of support to 
the Tamil separatists and was eventually considered counterproductive by later Indian 
administrations because of their official policy of LTTE marginalization (Pfaffenberger 
1995: 135). In 1985, India tried to negotiate a ceasefire between LTTE and the Sri 
Lankan government in Thimpu, Bhutan, but both sides failed to reach an agreement at the 
summit (Hariharan 2008: 39). Eventually, after realizing the danger the LTTE posed, the 
Indian government sent in peace-keeping forces in support of the Sri Lankan government 
to help stabilize the region (Pfaffenberger 1995: 135). 
 
India’s Military Aid 
 The LTTE’s early success against the Sri Lankan government would have been 
reversed were it not for India’s intervention. The Indian intelligence, Raw and Analysis 
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Wing (RAW), provided weapons training and battlefield strategy to LTTE fighters. As 
stated by Sengupta and Ganguly (2013: 112),  
 
“The RAW, India’s external spy agency, implemented India’s 
strategy of diffusion of the Sri Lankan Tamil insurgents by opening bases 
and training camps mostly in the Ramanathapuram district in southern 
Tamil Nadu. The RAW training typically consisted of field craft, tactics, 
map reading, jungle and guerrilla warfare, and training in weapons system 
such as light and medium machine guns, automatic rifles, pistols, and rocket 
propelled grenades. Instructions regarding how to use bombs, lay mines, and 
establish telecommunications were also provided.” 
 
 The RAW support that the LTTE received improved their chances of survival on 
the battlefield and throughout the war. Specifically, the LTTE’s fighting capacity was at 
its peak when receiving military aid from India. Between 1983-1987, the LTTE’s control 
of Sri Lankan territory grew; however, they did not completely control their entire 
territorial claim, which covered over half of the coastline and major port cities. 
Ultimately, the LTTE did control a majority of the Northern and Eastern provinces 
(Fourman 2014: 104). The LTTE was able to utilize the training by taking control of 
major ports and coastline of Sri Lanka, which gave them the advantage over government 
forces. Therefore, the military aid provided by India improved the LTTE’s likelihood of 
survival because they were able to use that training to defeat Sri Lankan government 
forces at strategic locations. Economic aid provided by India also proved essential in the 
continued LTTE struggle for independence, as examined in the following section.  
 
India’s Economic Aid  
 India’s military aid proved to have a significant impact on the LTTE’s likelihood 
of survival against the Sri Lankan government forces. However, although military aid is 
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critical for a group’s chances of survival, additional types of aid help maintain their fight. 
India provided crucial economic aid to help sustain LTTE forces and civilians. 
Specifically, the Indian air force provided food and supplies to LTTE in the city of 
Jaffna, which is a key port city in northern Sri Lanka (Sengupta and Ganguly 2013: 113-
14). India’s economic aid made a larger impact on the LTTE’s chances of survival 
because it allowed them to maintain their fight against the Sri Lankan government forces 
until they ceded control to Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF). Therefore, we can 
assume that the economic aid provided additional support to the LTTE’s fight and 
ensured that they could sustain themselves for some time. India also provided moral 
support, which may also have impacted the LTTE’s chances of survival.  
 
India’s Moral Support  
 India’s military and economic aid was critical for their chances of survival against 
the Sri Lankan government forces. During the period of Indian external support, 1983-
1987, it is difficult to find any evidence that India provided any moral support to the 
LTTE. Any Indian moral support was initiated by the Tamil Nadu population in southern 
India because of anger towards the Sri Lankan government and their actions. India’s 
government was hesitant to intervene on the LTTE’s behalf. The Indian government 
initiated covert support to the Sri Lankan government in the form of military and 
economic aid. India unsuccessfully tried to mediate various negotiations between Sri 
Lanka and LTTE between 1983-1987. Eventually, these unsuccessfully interventions led 
to the India government sending the IPKF to help defeat the LTTE and put an end to the 
fighting. The failure to obtain India’s moral support seemed to hurt the LTTE’s chance of 
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survival, and to an extent, the LTTE did lose momentum. However, that did not last long 
as seen in the following Eelam wars that occurred. Therefore, moral support did play a 
factor in ending the first Eelam war; however, India’s military and economic aid provides 
crucial information for this study. As in the KLA case, military aid was crucial for the 
separatist group. The training provided by India to the LTTE provided them the necessary 
skills to defeat Sri Lankan forces and control key ports; therefore, providing the 
advantage in mediation talks. It is clear that this aid rendered the LTTE separatist 
movement sustainable and played a critical role in their early successes in the 1980s 
period of the conflict. 
 
Lack of External Actor (1991-2020)  
 As this section focuses on external support that occurred from 1991 to present, the 
external support from India is disregarded because it occurred before the observed years. 
From 1991 to present, the LTTE was not as fortunate to receive the external support that 
they had received in 1980s. 2 The LTTE by this point had a reputation as a dangerous 
organization and the international community targeted them. Over 30 states within the 
international community designated the LTTE an international terrorist organization 
(DeVotta 2009: 1040). Many of these states declared the LTTE as the main obstacle to 
resolving the conflict (DeVotta 2009: 1040). The LTTE did not provide any support to 
counter these accusations; they continued to violate ceasefires that had been agreed upon 
with the Sri Lankan government.  
 
2 According to W. Alejandro Sanchez Nieto (2008), Singapore and Burma are weapons suppliers for LTTE; 
however, that could not be verified (578).  
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 The LTTE suffered from not having an external actor to provide support during 
this period, such as was afforded them by India in the 1980s. The LTTE’s reputation also 
ultimately diminished the likelihood of another external actor providing aid, a crucial 
difference from the KLA in the Kosovo war. Furthermore, by violating ceasefire 
agreements, the LTTE continued to portray themselves as a volatile separatist movement 
that only wanted to cause destruction. This reputation the LTTE created made it difficult 
to justify any UN member to politically support them. 
 
External Actor Military Aid  
 The absence of an external actor is not always the clear reason why a separatist 
group is defeated by the central state, but in many cases this factor plays a critical role in 
the outcome of the conflict. Theoretically, any time that a separatist group receives 
support from an external actor, the group’s probability of survival should improve. In the 
case of Kosovo, we saw the KLA’s probability of survival improve greatly by receiving 
military aid from NATO. On the other hand, in the LTTE case, the absence of aid from 
an external actor hurt their probability of survival. At the time, when India was providing 
military aid to the LTTE in the 80s, the separatist group was successfully took control of 
entire regions of Sri Lanka. After India ceased providing aid in 1990, the LTTE failed to 
maintain control of those regions.  
The Sri Lankan military force was larger than the LTTE which gave them a 
distinct advantage. According to Nieto (2008: 578), “Sri Lankan armed forces (numbered 
around 240,000) against Tamil rebels (10,000).” The LTTE was outnumbered by Sri 
Lankan forces and would have benefited significantly from receiving military aid from an 
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external actor. By 2004, the LTTE had lost 70% of the territory that they had controlled 
since the 1980s (Fourman 2014: 103). Military aid from an external actor would have 
helped the LTTE to maintain territory that they had successful taken. Moreover, the 
external actor’s military aid would have given the LTTE the opportunity to repel counter 
offensives that the Sri Lankan government forces launched against them in 2008 and 
further diminished LTTE forces. Despite these reversals, a key reason why the LTTE 
may have been able to continue their conflict throughout the years could be the weapons 
training and battlefield strategies that India provided them. The lack of military aid had a 
critical impact on the LTTE for several reasons, yet they were able to continue the 
struggle for an additional 18 years, perhaps in part because of the Indian training that 
some veterans may have passed down. Ultimately, the lack of military aid was a death 
sentence for the LTTE.  
 In sum, additional military aid would have improved the probability of survival 
for the LTTE by providing them the extra resources necessary to allowed them to survive 
the counterattack that the Sri Lankan government launched to recover the land they had 
lost. In the Kosovo case, military aid was vital for them to fight the central government 
and gain legitimacy. Therefore, the LTTE had initial success against their central 
government; however, they failed to maintain their position and succumbed to the central 
government forces.  
 
External Actor Economic Aid 
 The LTTE benefited greatly from India providing economic aid in 1987 which 
allowed them to continue to fight until India decided to shift their position. In particular, 
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as with the lack of military aid, a lack of economic aid hurt the LTTE. There is no 
evidence that an external actor provided the LTTE with economic aid from 1991 to 
present. The lack of economic aid was a blow to the LTTE because they did not have the 
luxury of providing resources to their fighters as they once did in 1987. The lack 
economic and military aid greatly diminished the LTTE’s likelihood of survival because 
they did not have the necessary resources to keep fighting against the capable Sri Lankan 
military force. Since the LTTE did not have military or economic aid, it is important to 
analyze how moral support impacted their chance of survival.  
 
External Actor Moral Support  
 The LTTE’s failure to establish an independent Tamil state was caused by not 
having external actor support to fight the Sri Lankan government. The Indian government 
played a critical role in shaping the international community’s perception of the LTTE. 
As stated by Sengupta and Ganguly (2013: 118), “India’s stance against the LTTE, 
convinced U.S., U.K., and Canada to designate LTTE as a Terrorist Organization.” India 
heavily influenced some of the great powers of the world to declare LTTE a terrorist 
organization. Furthermore, India utilized their diplomatic networks to depict the LTTE as 
a ruthless terrorist organization that murdered thousands of innocent civilians (Sengupta 
and Ganguly 2013: 119). The LTTE’s criminal activity, including smuggling and drug 
trafficking, only reinforced India’s claims which impacted the international community 
decision to not support their self-determination movement.  
30 states in the international community considered the LTTE the root problem of 
the Sri Lankan war, making it a challenge for the separatist group to convince any 
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country to provide them military aid. The international community’s negative perception 
of the LTTE meant few, if any states were willing to support the separatist group for fear 
of diplomatic repercussion.  
 The LTTE’s geographic location may have dissuaded any external actor from 
providing military aid because the LTTE presented few tangible advantages or benefits 
for an external actor. Moreover, LTTE’s leader, Prabhakaran, failed to exploit any of 
their territorial or military gains to establish political legitimacy (DeVotta 2009: 1040). 
The failure to utilize political gains, as well as the lack of resources or strategic 
geography ultimately eliminated any opportunity for states to give the LTTE legitimacy. 
The failed legitimacy from any state made the LTTE’s fight for self-determination 
difficult to achieve because they were viewed as the problem and not the solution to the 
conflict. This case fortifies the argument that receiving military aid from an external actor 
is crucial to a separatist group establishing legitimacy because if the external state views 
the separatist group as a liability, the likelihood of receiving aid is slim; however, if the 
potential external actor viewed the group’s fight for self-determination as righteous the 
chances are high. Therefore, the probability of survival for the LTTE was slim because 
unlike the KLA, the international community did not see its cause as legitimate and 
would not provide military aid because of their reputation.  
 
Probability of Survival  
 The LTTE was defeated by the lack of external actor support and in particular 
military aid. On January 2, 2008, the Sri Lankan government pulled out of the 2002 
ceasefire agreement which was mediated by Norway and successfully recaptured LTTE 
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occupied territories (Wickramasinghe 2009: 59). The successful offensive was crucial in 
helping end the conflict spanning over four decades. The LTTE’s likelihood of survival 
was slim because although they were able to fight the central government forces for 
decades, they could not maintain their cause for self-determination due to the lack of 
military aid. In the Kosovo case, military aid was critical for the separatist group’s 
survivability. The LTTE did have external support from India initially, though it was not 
as comprehensively supported as the KLA was by NATO, which led to them failing to 
repel the counteroffensive that the Sri Lankan government forces launched in 2008. 
Receiving military aid from an external actor would have increased their likelihood of 
survival because it would have provided them an opportunity to maintain control of their 
occupied territories and establish legitimacy for their cause of self-determination. In sum, 
the lack of external actor aid from 1991-present hurt the LTTE’s probability of survival. 
 
Implications 
  The LTTE’s case provides insight for why military aid increases the chances of 
survival for a separatist group. The LTTE had great success in their initial fight for self-
determination when supported by India. However, once the LTTE lost this aid, they 
failed to maintain control over their captured territories, which was a crucial blow. The 
failure to hold this territory is linked to not having the necessary military aid to continue 
their fight. The LTTE failed to take political advantage of the territory they had captured, 
but I think you should expound on that here. If they had used their control of that territory 
to secure autonomy or semi-autonomy, especially with India’s tacit support, they could 
still have their independence today. Furthermore, the KLA had success in maintaining 
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control of their territory because of the targeted bombing NATO provided. The LTTE did 
not have the same level of support from India, which made it difficult for them to hold off 
the central government forces’ counterattacks. Yet, the LTTE’s reasons for not receiving 
external actor military aid go deeper than lack economic aid and moral support.  
  In order to receive any type of external aid, a separatist group must have some 
kind of strategic importance. The LTTE did not represent territory or resources of 
strategic importance to any great powers, nor did the prospect of supporting them offer 
any pragmatic benefits for an external actor to gain. Sri Lanka sits just south of India and 
does not provide any significant ports for an adversary to utilize, and does not offer any 
potential for the formation of a security partnership because they are isolated from the 
rest of  South and Southeast Asia. Therefore, an external actor would be taking a great 
risk by supporting the LTTE because of the lack of potential they offer.  
 In sum, the LTTE case provides insight as to why an external actor would provide 
a separatist group with military aid. The LTTE did not provide any strategic benefits for 
an external actor to establish relations with them because ultimately, they failed to 
provide an alliance that could benefit a regional power outside of India. Supporting the 
LTTE with military aid would be unappealing to an external actor because it would 
necessarily challenge India; therefore, hurting their chances of being able to influence the 
rest of Asia. The LTTE case reveals the importance for a separatist group to offer 
pragmatic benefits to a potential external actor. Without this, a strategic alliance for an 






V. Research Design and Analysis  
 
Case Selection, Dataset, and Limitations 
The case studies of the KLA and LTTE were selected to provide significant insight 
about some of the concepts that have an impact on the probability of survival for 
separatist groups. Specifically, we selected both cases to illustrate the effectiveness of 
military aid is to a separatist group’s probability of survival. A quantitative analysis of 75 
cases looking at external actors’ support for separatist groups, over 29 years from 1991 to 
present, should shed light on the frequency of these occurrences and establishes a 
correlation between external actor support and an increase in the probability of survival 
for a separatist group.  
This analysis hopes to contribute to the literature on separatist survival by identifying 
three essential variables. My research utilizes Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) 
External Support Dataset (2011) database to establish quantitative support for three 
variables. These variables are [1] Military Aid, [2] Economic Aid, and [3] Moral Support. 
Furthermore, World Bank GDP Per Capita (2020) data is utilized to analyze an external 
actor’s wealth. If the external actor has a larger GDP then they are expected to provide 
more aid, while lower GDP is expected to correlate to a lower likelihood of providing 
aid. There are limitations to this research; only 75 cases were observed, which makes 
statistical significance more challenging to achieve. The 75 cases that were identified are
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the universal separatist cases for the time period observed. I verified that in each case 
observed, the separatist group wanted to establish their independence; any case where 
this did not occur was excluded. Only three cases provided data on economic aid that 
external actors gave to separatist groups because most states do not disclose support for a 
separatist group; which further limits the results for this research. Furthermore, these are 
three bivariate results and are not conclusive. They are indicative which suggests that 
further research is needed along these lines. Additional control factors, such as proportion 
of a group’s population that are fighting for succession and military power of the host 
country would help further clarify this research.  
Lastly, this research conducted for the exclusive intent of establishing whether there 
is a difference in impact from various types of aid on the outcome of a conflict. If there is 
a distinction, then further research is needed. The findings here are thus necessarily 
preliminary.   
 
Operationalizing Dependent Variable  
For the dependent variable, the various levels of survival for a separatist group are 
analyzed. Survival is operationalized on a scale from [0,1,2,3,4], with [0] representing 
failed secession, [1] indicating secessionists still fighting but have not succeed, [2] de 
facto state, secessionists have limited recognition, [3] secessionists have general 
recognition but not universal, and [4] secessionists achieved independence and have 
received recognition from a majority of the world. The concept of survival is defined by 
whether a group has achieved the necessary success that is prerequisite for independence. 
These measurements provide insight into how likely it is that a group will survive. 
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Groups are also measured by strength, which is expected to correlate strongly with 
survivability and thus achievement of independence. 
 
Operationalizing Independent Variables 
 The goal of this research is to find which of these variables has the greatest 
impact and most improves the separatist group’s probability of survival. Hopefully, we 
can distinguish which variable, or variables are universal to the cases that have been 
observed. Specifically, military aid is expected to be the most crucial aid to a separatist 
group’s probability of survival 
 
1. Military Aid 
Nonstate actors, like separatist groups, do not have the necessary military 
resources and thus receiving military aid from an external actor is critical to their 
probability of survival. As seen in the Kosovo case, the KLA’s probability of survival 
improved dramatically when NATO began their air operations and targeting strategy 
against the Serbian government forces. On the other hand, in the LTTE case, military aid 
from India improved their ability to enter into conflict with Sri Lankan government 
forces. However, the lack of military aid from 1991 to present damaged the LTTE’s 
chance of surviving because it did not have the external support that could have improved 
their odds against the government forces. Military aid can provide a variety of benefits 
for the separatist to use to their advantage against the central government.  
The military aid variable is measured on an index ranging from [0] to [5], with [0] 
no external actor support being the lowest level of support, [1] weapons and troop 
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training provided by advisors, [2] advisors providing organization and insight for combat 
operations, [3] provides small arms ammunition, armored personnel carriers, artillery, 
tanks, fighter jets, helicopters, missiles, and attire, [4] provides security forces to conduct 
co-vert operations in support of secessionist forces, [5] external actor armed forces that 
provide control over contested territory and/or engage in combat operations against the 
central government, which is the highest support a separatist group may receive.  
 
2. Economic Aid 
Most separatist groups do not have the wealth to support a conflict against their 
parent state. Some separatist groups may have the fortune of possessing resources that 
originate in their region to sell for weapons and supplies, but that narrative is not relevant 
to this research as separatist groups need outside support. Also, external actors become 
involved because they are self-interested and will initiate support to a separatist group if 
there are tangible gains. We saw that NATO helped sustain Kosovo and KLA for a 
decade after the war ended, while the LTTE only received limited supplies from India, 
which did not last.  
The economic aid variable is operationalized as an average of money groups 
received from an external actor. The lowest level of support that comes from an external 
actor ranges from $0 to $399 million, the next level of support ranges from $400 million 
to $799 million, and the highest level of support ranges from $800 million to $1 billion or 





3. Moral Support 
In the international community, to become a state, it is imperative to have a 
majority of the world provide recognition. The probability of survival for a separatist 
group trying to establish legitimacy and independence depends on how the international 
community perceives their self-determination movement. In the case of the KLA, the 
U.S. and U.K. utilized their power and positions to pressure other states to recognize their 
independence. While for the LTTE, India used their influence to convince great powers 
to designate them as a terrorist group. Establishing “De Facto State” status does not 
exactly achieve the status of independence that the separatist group strives for because 
they are still under the control of the central state. Therefore, it is crucial for a separatist 
group to receive recognition from a majority of the world to gain the independence they 
have strived to achieve.  
 The moral support variable is measured on an index ranging from [0] to [4], with 
[0] showing no external recognition as the lowest level of support, [1] acknowledgement 
of the secessionist, [2] expression of solidarity with an external actor, [3] 
diplomatic/formal ties with the secessionist, and [4] recognition of independence as the 
highest level of support that a separatist group can receive.       
 All measurements for the three independent variables were run through a 







In separatist wars, having resources is a crucial aspect for any side to improve 
their probability of survival. Secessionist groups receiving economic investment from 
external actors can improve their chances of surviving a war against governments. 
Groups receiving such support will also have the opportunity to buy food and textiles for 
their fighters, which could potentially boost the morale of their fighters. The lack of food 
and clothing is one of the biggest reasons why secessionist groups do not have enough 
fighters. Running out of food could lower morale and result in thousands of fighters 
joining the adversary’s forces. Having food and proper clothing, could also help fighters 
endure rough climate conditions to continue fighting. Furthermore, the secessionist group 
can also use these funds to pay their fighters. Receiving payments may increase their 
fighters’ resolve to stay and continue to carry on the fight against the government. The 
payments that their soldiers receive may also increase their support for the war because 
they may have grievances against the government for their lack of support that they did 
not receive as citizens.  
Another way secessionist groups may use the economic funds from external 
actors is in the covert operations area. The group can use the funds to produce 
propaganda against the government with the goal of persuading the rest of the population 
to buy into their cause for fighting against the government. The external actor can help in 
this area by providing them with materials to buy handouts for the public. Also, they may 
have the chance to use the funds to buy radio or news stations to further express their 
ideology for why they fight, while using these stations to provide information on the war. 
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They can influence the population by showing that they are winning the war via these 
outlets. Lastly, secessionists can use the economic aid to fortify their defenses to ensure 
that they can maintain captured areas. The external actor, depending on the state, can give 
the secessionist group a greater amount of economic funding that will allow them to 
continue the fighting which improves their probability of survival, which leads to the first 
hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 1: As an external actor’s economic aid increases the secessionist 
group’s probability of survival improves.   
 
Although external actors may be able to provide economic support to secessionist 
groups, they can also provide military aid in various ways. The secessionist groups are 
not able to provide enough or adequate weapons for their fighters when they are engaged 
in combat. The lack of equipment hurts the separatist’s chances of winning the war and 
they may seek assistance elsewhere. Therefore, it seems that the government forces are 
able to outlast separatists when they encounter each other on the battlefield. However, 
external actors can step in and provide support to separatist groups to improve their 
probability of survival.  
External actors can provide secessionist groups weapons, ammunition, or troops 
to aid them in their fight against the government. Giving them more modern weapons 
than they could otherwise access can improve their chances of surviving fights against 
government forces. Having new weapons can also improve the morale of the soldiers 
who are fighting because it gives them the sense that they are fighting for a just cause 
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against the central government. The external actor takes their rebellion seriously, giving 
the fighters a greater sense of self-worth and respect. Also, the improved accuracy of 
these weapons can lead to more favorable combat outcomes for separatist forces, which 
could turn the tide of war in their favor. 
 Furthermore, external actors’ military aid can provide training to separatist 
soldiers. Receiving the proper training can improve the secessionist fighters’ physical 
health, improving their performance in combat with government forces or when enduring 
difficult climate conditions. The training can also give the secessionist groups an 
opportunity to have more effective strategies when engaging the government forces by 
using the external actor’s combat methods. Another key component for training 
secessionist forces is giving them a chance to extend their lives and continue to fight for 
longer periods. 
External actors can also provide support by sending in special forces who can 
provide combat strategies to the groups. Generals, or special forces can give secessionist 
groups firsthand assistance in planning a strategy when going into battle. Sometimes 
leaders in these groups may not have proper education on battle tactics and can therefore 
hurt their sides chances of surviving the war. Furthermore, having special forces fighting 
alongside the secessionist fighters can improve the probability of secessionist survival 
because the special forces can guide them through the battle and provide them with the 
necessary support. Lastly, the external actor can send in their military to reinforce the 
separatist group and provide stability for the occupy area.  
Secessionist groups that receive military aid from external actors improve their 
probability of surviving the war. However, even though there is a chance of them not 
 50 
winning the war, there still is a chance that their fighting will intensify over time. The 
weapons and ammunition that they receive could allow them to confidently face more 
substantial government forces. The weapons and training will improve their chances of 
survival and allow them to fight with more intensity. Also, having generals or special 
forces that have proper education and training only further improves their chances of 
taking strategic areas from government forces. Finally, the external actor may send in 
their military to reinforce and maintain stability for the separatist forces and their area of 
interest. The secessionist fighters may become inspired by receiving aid, therefore, they 
will continue to fight with more intensity which could improve their probability of 
survival. This discussion provides the second hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 2: As an external actor’s military aid increases, the secessionist 
group’s probability of survival improves.   
 
Furthermore, after the external actor provides secessionist groups with economic 
and military aid, the external actor may use moral support to appeal to the secessionists, 
and the ethnic population that reside within the region. The external actor may use 
speeches to call for unity and cooperation from both sides. Also, external actors may 
discuss historical connections to the region which they believe rightfully belongs to them 
and thus that they have a right to protect. The moral support may also motivate the 
secessionist fighters to continue to pursue their cause. Also, this may encourage the 
secessionist fighters to fight with more intensity because they believe that they are not 
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only fighting for their region, but for the country that supports them. This discussion 
leads us to the third hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: As an external actor’s moral support increases, the secessionist 
group’s probability of survival improves.   
  
Finally, all three types of aid are inextricably correlated to the probability of 
survival for separatists. However, military aid offers the highest probability of survival 
for any separatist group because of the impact it has on the conflict. Military aid allows 
separatists to maximize their chances of survival by using weapons, armed forces, and 
military advisors from the external actor to challenge the central political authority. 
Essentially, the argument is made here that economic aid provides the highest probability 
of survival for separatists because of the investments that are made by the external actor. 
However, it is military aid that triumphs over economic aid because it is the fundamental 
resources like weapons, armed forces, and military advisors that increase the probability 
of survival for separatists. Therefore, this discussion leads to the final hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 4: Military aid increases a secessionist group’s probability of 






VI. Results and Discussion 
 
In Table 6.1, the variables perform as follows:  
 
 
In the first model, all three variables are present and have not reached to 1.96 
threshold to achieve statistical significance, most likely because of the limited number of 
cases. Since none of the variables achieved statistical significance, each variable was run 
separately to see if they have any significant impact. All variables should be run 
simultaneously but this is not possible. When running each variable separately, in Model 
2, Military Aid does have statistical significance at 2.57. In Model 3, Moral Support has 
statistical significance at 2.36. Finally, in Model 4, Economic Aid does not have any 
statistical significance because it has a 0 and is thus disregarded in the ensuing models.  
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It was expected that Military Aid would have the most significance, followed by 
Economic Aid. Moral Support was expected to have the least significance. However, the 
results show otherwise. The mixed results from these models demand further research as 
there seems to be unexpected significance to these variables. Military Aid is the most 
significant variable, yet Moral Support is the second-most significant while Economic 
Aid is the least impactful variable. Economic Aid may be the least significant because of 
the limited evidence of external actors supporting separatist groups economically. Further 







 There is evidence that Military Aid and Moral Support have statistical 
significance. This begs the question, does military aid from the three major powers have a 
stronger impact? In Table 6.2, we further break down the variable of Military Aid, and 
analyze the three major powers of the world, namely, The People’s Republic of China 
(PRC), The United States of America (USA), and Russian Federation (RF). These nations 
are classified as the three world major powers because they are widely considered to 
control the world’s most powerful militaries. Remarkably, even though these three 
countries are the top three, In Models 5-7, Military Aid for all three powers does not 
achieve statistical significance. These findings intimate that it does not matter where 
military aid originates, so countries like Senegal or Nigeria can have just as much of an 






 In Table 6.3, Moral Support is examined in a similar manner as Military Aid and 
statistical significance is achieved. When combining tables 2 and 3, it was expected that 
receiving support from the PRC and RF is the best option for a separatist group to 
survive, yet these findings contradict that assumption. The instability of this data causes 
the contrast in statistical significance between Moral Support and Military Aid and 
explains why there is an increase in Moral Support.  
Ultimately, the PRC’s Moral Support is more important than the USA’s. The 
findings here express that the PRC has a larger impact than the USA. If the PRC shows 
support, perhaps it has a stronger impact on the probability of separatist survival because 
they listen to the PRC’s strategies. There are various explanations for why this may be 
the case; for example, separatist groups that receive support from the PRC may be 
exclusively located within the Asian region, where the PRC has regional hegemony 
status. The host country could feel pressure from the resources that the PRC could 
provide for the separatist, which may embolden the separatist group to continue to fight 
and increase their probability of survival. Although in Model 10 Russia’s Moral Support 
variable does achieve statistical significance, the combined variable “Moral Support” 
does not achieve statistical significance, either. The instability of this data may be the 








The recent Russian intervention in Georgia (2008) and Eastern Ukraine (2014) 
has shown the relevance of an external actor’s support for a separatist movement. The 
prevalence of these conflicts emphasizes the need for continued research into external 
actor support for separatist groups, and its impact on their survivability. The variables 
analyzed here shed new light on how external aid improves the probability of survival for 
separatist groups. The crucial part of this research is understanding which type of aid 
gives the separatist groups the greatest chance of survival. Further research is needed 
before conclusive arguments can be extrapolated from this research.  
The literature on separatist survival is broad; however, there are limitations to 
how pervious scholars have analyzed which type of aid impacts survival. For this 
research, the variables were chosen logically, based on what was most crucial for what 
improves the probability of survival for a separatist group. Military aid and moral support 
were found to be most relevant in the majority of the observations, yet economic aid’s 
impact was difficult to confirm. The KLA and LTTE case studies provided further 
emphasis for the impact of military aid on the survivability of a separatist group.  
It should be noted that there is a clear distinction between the type of military aid 
that was provided to the KLA and that provided to the LTTE. The military aid the KLA 
received included NATO air support that targeted central government positions and 
helped push back government forces. NATO’s support allowed the KLA to maintain 
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control of their limited territory. On the other hand, the LTTE only received weapons and 
battlefield strategy training from India. The critically important air support and strategic 
targeting provided to the KLA was denied to the LTTE. It is obvious that one type of 
support made a larger impact then the other, which made be the difference in how it 
impacts the survivability of a separatist group. 
Future research is still needed in this area. The lack of economic aid data is still 
essential to the overall understanding of its impact on separatist survival. Although this 
research failed to find extensive data on economic aid for the 75 cases observed, future 
research may have the capability to establish the impact of this variable. Another avenue 
for future research is looking at the likelihood for why certain separatist groups are 
provided aid and others are not. Some separatist groups may not feel it is necessary to 
accept foreign aid for fear that it may hurt their legitimacy. Furthermore, external actors 
may not feel that there are any benefits to supporting certain groups. Finding this 
evidence could provide stronger insight into the survival of separatist groups. Finally, 
because of the lack of cases for this research, future new detailed data from sources like 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program could benefit this research. Adding more data could 
provide greater insight into this research and stronger analysis which could further our 
understanding of separatist survival.  
This article finds that military aid and moral support improve the probability of 
survival for a separatist group. A deeper analysis reveals that military aid among the three 
major powers (PRC, USA, RF) does not have a greater impact than from other sources. 
Thus, any country providing aid can have just as much of an impact as them. Further, we 
find that Moral Support from the PRC has more of an impact than the other two powers 
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(USA and RF), which is perhaps decided by the effectiveness and location. The 
distinction between the PRC’s Moral Support and the USA’s Moral Support could stem 
from the lack of stability from the USA’s executive branch. Stability plays a crucial role 
for separatist because it provides security and reassurances that the external actor may 
never withdraw their support. The USA’s inconsistent leadership may create mistrust 
from the separatist group because although the current President may support them, the 
future President may not have the same interest to support them. The PRC’s consistent 
leadership could appeal to the separatists accepting their support because as oppose to the 
USA’s ever-changing executive branch, the PRC can maintain support for a longer 
period. However, it should be noted that the majority of the PRC’s Moral Support in this 
research occurred at the beginning years because we know that it is unlikely that the PRC 
would support any modern separatists; therefore, some caution should be taken when 
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